Argon2id
Derives passphrase keys (32-byte output) for vault and recovery flows.
Technical Guide
This page summarizes Aegiro's cryptographic primitives, threat model, filesystem support matrix, and deep technical references.
Cryptographic Primitives
Derives passphrase keys (32-byte output) for vault and recovery flows.
Wraps key material and protects encrypted metadata blocks with integrity.
Provides post-quantum KEM for APFS/USB recovery wrapping and vault DEK access path.
Signs manifest hashes for authenticity checks in verify/doctor paths.
Threat Model
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Recovery bundle stolen without passphrase | Still locked: recovery keys are Argon2id-derived and never stored. |
| Wrong disk/image paired with a bundle | Identifier assertions plus AAD binding reject cross-target bundle reuse. |
| Bundle tampering | AES-GCM authentication tags detect modified wrapped secrets. |
| Nonce reuse concerns in wraps | Each wrap call generates an independent random 12-byte nonce. |
| Harvest-now/decrypt-later pressure | Kyber512 KEM protects recovery wrapping in current builds. |
Filesystem Support Matrix
| Volume type | apfs-volume-encrypt / apfs-volume-decrypt | usb-container-* | usb-vault-pack |
|---|---|---|---|
| APFS (writable) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Non-APFS (exFAT/FAT/NTFS writable) | ✕ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Read-only / locked media | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ |
Legend:supportednot supported
Deep References
Full implementation-level crypto paths, format behavior, and caveats.
Step-by-step APFS encryption/unlock schematics and bundle field definitions.
Architecture diagrams and before/after trees for each USB workflow mode.
Entry point for guides, legal, repository structure, and explanation docs.